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Abstract 
 
Transit Oriented Development (TOD) with railway service is recognized as a sustainable mode of development for highly 
dense megacities. In addition to providing safe and efficient transit services, reducing auto dependence and therefore less 
need for highway expansions, the improved accessibility of TOD influences commuters’ residential location choices and the 
resultant housing value. Traditionally, statistical approaches have been used to estimate the relationship between railway 
development and housing value for individual sites. To some degree, TOD has also been studied with integrated land-use 
transport models. While useful, they lack an analytical framework to study the region-wide impacts of TOD on residential 
location and travel choices and the resultant land value changes. In this study, the joint railway and housing development 
strategy is modeled based on a combined equilibrium formulation with the bid-rent process. The problem is formulated as a 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, in which the upper level optimizes the objective for the joint 
development strategy by deciding on the combination of housing supplies and railway service levels. Analytical results are 
obtained for a single corridor in a multi-modal transport network, which are further illustrated by sensitivity analyses. A 
numerical example is constructed to demonstrate the approach and compare with other separate development strategies. The 
results generaly confirm the synergy between railway and housing developments.  
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Delft University of 
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1. Introduction 
 
Transit Oriented Development (TOD) with railway service is recognized as a sustainable mode of 
development for highly dense megacities. Compared with cities with a high dependency on auto travel, TOD can 
substantially mitigate traffic congestion and avoid urban sprawl due to the ever increasing urban population. In 
addition to offering a sustainable mode of transportation, Litman [1] stated that transit can help reducing the 
amount of land that must be paved for roads and parking facilities, and providing a catalyst for more compact 
urban redevelopment. However, most railway projects involve huge investments, which are usually one of the 
major barriers for implementing TOD in developing countries. Therefore, a successful TOD project requires 
policies to encourage the provision of quality transit services with affordable fares, which are also financially 
sustainable.  
  Hong Kong is one of the few exceptions whose railway services are commercially operated, with reputable 
quality and profitability, often serving as a benchmark for new projects in the region and beyond. The railway 
company, Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC), builds, funds, owns, and operates the railway, and jointly 
develops housing above railway stations with a private developer [2]. In this way, the transport infrastructure 
development is cross-subsidized by housing development profits. The experience of Hong Kong sheds light on 
an approach that exploits the synergy between railway and housing developments [3]. The railway service 
improves the accessibility of housing to be developed and hence increases its value, which helps finance the 
infrastructure investment. Empirical studies show that property values generally increase in areas near quality 
transit stations [4]. In Bogotá, Colombia, for example, a reduction of five minutes of walking distance to nearby 
BRT stations increases property values up to 9.3% [5]. Munoz-Raskin [6] showed that middle-income 
households in Bogotá tend to spend 2.3% to 14.4% more for properties close to BRT stations. In the case of 
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Hong Kong, on average, profit from housing development accounts for almost 50% of the operating revenue and 
contributes to about 90% of the MTRC’s total profit [2,3,7]. On the other hand, housing development generates 
traffic for the railway service and hence increases its fare revenue. Higher fare revenue can afford better services, 
which in turn yield still higher patronage, thus initiating a positive cycle.  
  The joint railway and housing development strategy depends very much on the value capture, or the housing 
value in association with the accessibility improvement introduced. Classically, this type of study is 
accomplished via hedonic analyses [8]. The seminal work of Rosen [9], which explored the role of housing 
attributes in the consumer housing market, initiated a vast volume of studies that investigated both the theoretical 
foundation and empirical analyses of this approach. In particular, hedonic models have been developed to relate 
housing price to characteristics of the property such as proximity to amenities, accessibility, etc. Recently, 
Cervero and Murakami [10] discussed how the joint rail and property development model works in Hong Kong. 
While useful, these statistical approaches are typically developed based on regression analysis, which tend to be 
location specific without considering the overall system effect. For example, adding a new railway link will 
change the relative accessibility between locations and may induce region-wide shifts in residence choices, and 
ultimately, changes in housing value. That is, not only will locations along the new railway link be affected, but 
also other locations. To some degree, TOD has also been studied with integrated land-use transport models. To 
this end, it is more indicative if the study is integrated in a broader analytical framework, so that the impacts of 
transportation improvements at the network level can be incorporated directly.  
  In this study, an integrated modeling framework is developed to study the impact of joint railway and housing 
developments on region-wide residential location and travel choices, and the resultant housing value changes. It 
is based on a combined equilibrium formulation for residents’ location and travel choices with the bid-rent 
process [9,11,12,13]. In Ma and Lo [13], time-dependent transport supply and demand management (TS-DM) 
strategies by a welfare-oriented transport provider were investigated. By internalizing the effect of land use/value 
changes in the combined equilibrium formulation, the interactions between highway expansion, road pricing, and 
land use/value changes can be jointly considered, allowing for analyses such as exposing winners and losers of 
transport improvements, and possibly cross-subsidization between them and land sale. In this paper, to study the 
synergy between joint railway and housing development, the combined equilibrium formulation is extended to 
incorporate the joint optimization of railway and housing developments. In other words, we study the case of a 
transport provider who also serves as a housing developer, i.e. a single joint railway and property developer. 
Whereas joint railway and housing development by one developer is not common in Western countries, it is not 
uncommon in Asia, especially in Hong Kong and mainland China. In recent years, many Asian megacities have 
started to explore similar approaches. 
  Specifically, the problem is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The 
lower level problem constitutes the combined equilibrium formulation encapsulating the bid-rent process, 
whereas the upper level objective is to maximize the combined profit from the joint railway and housing 
development by deciding on the combination of housing supplies (e.g. location and type of housing) and the 
railway service levels (e.g. headway and fare). Section 2 describes the general formulation of the modeling 
framework. Analytical results are derived for a single corridor in a multi-modal transport network. A monotonic 
relationship is found between changes in land value and railway service quality, i.e. better railway services 
always lead to higher land value or housing prices. Sensitivity analyses are performed to illustrate these 
properties. Section 3 describes the numerical studies, and Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. The 
results generally show that joint railway and housing development strategy is systematically better than treating 
railway and housing developments separately. There are benefits to be gained by exploiting the synergy between 
them. The results also indicate that even if the joint development were to be invested by a single profit-oriented 
developer, whose strategies would introduce quality transport system improvement on its own initiative, in 
return for gains in housing revenue. That is to say, the private developer would not compromise the transport 
system performance.  
2. The formulation 
 
2.1 Residents’ location and travel choices 
 
Residents’ choices include both residential location and corresponding travel choices, as modeled by a 
combined bid-rent and nested multinomial logit framework. The highest level is the residential location choice, 
then travel modal choice, finally route choice.  
 
2.1.1 Travel choice 
 
The generalized travel cost by railway includes travel time, expressed in monetary terms, monetary costs, e.g. 
fare, and travel comfort index. Since normally a railway network constitutes a limited number of railway lines 
operated by a single company, and most of the regular railway passengers choose a unique path between OD 
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pairs, without loss of generality, it is assumed that there exists one railway path between each OD pair1. As a 
result, the generalized travel cost on railway between OD pair r  and s  valuated by travelers in income group 
k  is formulated as:  
 rail ( )
rsk rs rs k rsc ct_i ct_w vot cp    ,  (1) 
where rsct_i  and rsct_w  are the in-vehicle travel time and waiting time between OD pair r  and s , respectively; 
kvot  is the value of time for income group k ; rscp  is the fare between r  and s . The in-vehicle travel time 
between r  and s , rsct_i , is assumed to be fixed once the railway is built. The waiting time, rsct_w , is assumed 
to be proportional to the headway, rshw , expressed as: 
 
 rs rsctict_w hwN  , (2) 
where ctiN  is a positive headway/waiting time parameter. In this formulation, the railway service level is 
measured by the headway, rshw  and the fare, rscp , between r  and s , which are the decision variables of 
railway design for the developer. Note that in the real world the average headway/waiting time experienced by a 
traveler depends on the actual headway of each railway line he takes. For simplicity, the headway defined in this 
study is based on each OD pair, which constitutes a subset of the actual line-based headway combinations.  
For the auto mode, the generalized auto travel cost captures travel time and other monetary cost. The auto 
travel cost for travelers in income group k  between r  and s  through auto path p , notated as |autorskpc , is the 
sum of the path’s corresponding link travel times at , and toll charges aU ,  
 
 |auto , ( )
rsk rs k
p a p a a
a
c vot tG U  ¦ , (3) 
where ,
rs
a pG  is the path-link incidence indicator, equals 1 if link a  is on path p  between r  and s ; 0 
otherwise. The BPR link performance function is adopted to calculate link time at . The probability of travelers 
in income group k  between r  and s  using path p  is expressed as: 
 
 
route |auto
|auto
route '|auto
'
exp( )
Pr
exp( )
rs
k rsk
prsk
p k rsk
p
p P
c
c
E
E

   ¦ . (4) 
The expected perceived auto travel cost between OD pair r  and s  of income group k  can be expressed as 
the following logsum term: 
 auto route '|auto
'route
1
ln exp( )
rs
rsk k rsk
pk
p P
c cEE 
    § ·¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (5) 
 
Note that (3)-(5) represent a money-based multi-class stochastic traffic assignment formulation by 
categorizing travelers into groups with different VOTs. Under the further condition of homogeneous VOT, it 
produces the same unique user equilibrium link flow patterns2. Accordingly, the probability that travelers in 
income group k  choose travel mode m  among alternatives {rail, auto}m  between OD pair r  and s  is 
expressed as: 
 
m
m' '
' {rail, auto}
exp( )
Pr
exp( )
k rsk
rsk m
m k rsk
m
m
c
c
E
E

   ¦ ,  (6) 
where rskmc  is the systematic part of the expected travel cost of travel mode m  between OD pair r  and s  for 
travelers in income group k , with a random term rskmZ  following the Gumbel distribution. mkE  is the scale 
parameter for income group k  using travel mode m  which is inversely proportional to the standard deviation 
of rskmZ . Also, the travel disutility of a resident in income group k  working in workplace s  chooses to live in 
residential location r  is expressed as: 
 m' '
' {rail, auto}m
1
ln exp( )rsk k rskmk
m
cP EE    ¦ . (7) 
Finally, the corresponding railway flow and auto path flows between OD pair r  and s  for travelers in 
income group k , are expressed as: 
 rail railPr
rvsk rvsk rskq q  , (8) 
                                                          
1 This is purely for simplicity. Extending this to a network of rail lines can be achieved without any conceptual difficulty, similar to the 
approach developed for the auto mode shown below. 
2 See more discussions on the equilibrium flow conditions in Ma and Lo [13], Daganzo [14], and Yang and Huang [15]. 
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 |auto auto |autoPr Pr
rvsk rvsk rsk rsk
p pf q   . (9) 
where rvskq  is the demand between OD pair r  and s  for travelers residing in housing type v  in income group 
k , which is determined by the location choices in the following section. 
 
2.1.1.1 Location choice 
 
A combined bid-rent and multinomial logit framework is developed to formulate the residential location 
choice problem. The bid-rent theory considers that residents bid for residential locations based on the principle 
of utility maximization subject to budget constraints [9]. The term /sk rvWP , or Willingness-to-Pay ( WP ), 
represents the maximum value that a bidder of income group k  at workplace s  is willing to pay for a housing 
unit of type v  at residential location r  in order to maximize his overall utility [12]. The WP  function is 
expressed as: 
 
 /sk rv sk rsk k vWP b ls wpP D     , (10) 
where skb  is a utility index, representing the bidder’s desired level of utility at equilibrium. rskP  is the 
corresponding travel disutility between r  and s  as perceived by residents in income group k , as defined in (7)
. vls  represents the hedonic attribute of housing type v . In this formulation, it refers to the housing lot size. kD  
is the taste parameter of lot size by residents of income group k . wp  adjusts the bids to the observed or actual 
housing rents and can be considered as a calibration parameter. For the stochastic bid-rent process, WP  is 
considered as a random variable consisting of the systematic part as expressed in (10) and the random term 
/sk rvZ  following the identical and independently distributed (IID) Gumbel distribution, with E  as the scale 
parameter. By adjusting the utility index, skb , the housing supply and demand equilibrium can be attained with 
all residents able to find a residence given the assumption that the total number of housing supply equals the 
total number of housing demand, expressed as [12]:  
 
 
' ' ' '
' ' ' '
r v s k
r R v V s S k K
D
   
<  ¦¦ ¦¦ , (11) 
where ' 'r v<  is the housing supply of type 'v  in residential location 'r , which is endogenously determined by 
housing developers as described in the following section. ( )skD W  is the total number of residents of income 
group k  working in s . It is assumed to be exogenously fixed; hence the dimension of the utility index skb  is 
S Ku . 
Accordingly, the probability of housing type v  at residential location r  being occupied by residents of 
income group k  working in workplace s  is expressed as: 
 
/
/
' '/
' '
exp( )
Pr
exp( )
sk rv
sk rv
s k rv
s k SK
WP
WP
E
E

 ¦ . (12) 
Based on (12), the OD flows of residents in income group k  between residential location r  and workplace 
s  is obtained by: 
 /Prrvsk rv sk rvq  <  . (13) 
In addition, according to the discrete choice theory for the logit model [16], the expected maximum 
willingness-to-pay, which constitutes the eventual housing rent, after factoring in the supply influence [13] is 
expressed as: 
  ' '/
' '
1 1
ln exp ln( )rv s k rv rv
s k SK
WPM EE E     <
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (14) 
 
Accordingly, the consumer surplus of a resident of income group k  working in workplace s  choosing to 
reside in housing type v  at location r  is expressed as: 
 
 /rvsk sk rv rvCS WP M  . (15) 
The consumer surplus measures the willingness-to-pay of income group k  for housing type v  at residence 
location r  minus its actual rent and can be regarded as an incentive or utility in residential location choice from 
the perspective of residents, following the principle of utility maximization. 
 
2.1.1.2 Combined equilibrium formulation 
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The combined bid-rent and nested multinomial choice framework formulated in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 
constitutes an equilibrium model. The entire equilibrium problem can be cast into equivalent Nonlinear 
Complementarity Problem (NCP), given that the total number of housing supply equals the total number of 
housing demand, and solved accordingly [17]: 
 
 /|auto |auto auto |auto( Pr Pr Pr ) 0,   , , , ,
rvsk rvsk rv sk rv rsk rsk
p p pf f r v s p k<      , (16) 
 /|auto auto |autoPr Pr Pr 0,   , , , ,
rvsk rv sk rv rsk rsk
p pf r v s p k<    t  , (17) 
 /rail rail rail( Pr Pr ),  , , ,
rvsk rvsk rv sk rv rskq q r v s k<    , (18) 
 /rail railPr Pr 0,  , , ,
rvsk rv sk rv rskq r v s k<   t  , (19) 
 
/( Pr ) 0,   ,sk rv sk rv sk
rv
b D s k<    ¦ , (20) 
 
/Pr 0,   ,rv sk rv sk
rv
D s k<   t ¦ , (21) 
 |auto 0, , , , ,
rvsk
pf r v s p kt  , (22) 
 rail 0,  , , ,
rvskq r v s kt  , (23) 
 0, ,skb s kt  . (24) 
 
(16)-(17) and (18)-(19) model residents’ travel choices, where the auto path flow, |auto
rvsk
pf , and railway flow, 
rail
rvskq , follow exactly the probabilities as defined in (4) and (6), respectively. Similarly, (20)-(21) model the 
residents’ residential location choice at equilibrium. (20)-(21) assure that every resident can eventually be 
located, i.e. the total housing supply equals the total housing demand. 
The above reformulation can be further reformulated as an unconstrained optimization problem, by 
minimizing the following gap function to zero [18,19].  
 
 
 
 
/
|auto |auto auto |auto
/
rail rail rail
/
min ( ) ,   Pr Pr Pr
                   ,  Pr Pr
                   ,  Pr
rvsk rvsk rv sk rv rsk rsk
p p p
rvskp
rvsk rvsk rv sk rv rsk
rvsk
sk rv sk rv sk
sk rv
G f f
q q
b D
-
-
-
 <   
 <  
 <  § ·¨ ¸© ¹
¦
¦
¦ ¦
Ζ
, (25) 
where ( )-   is defined as:  
    21, ,
2
c d c d- I , (26) 
    2 2,c d c d c dI     . (27) 
 
c  and d  in (26)-(27) are real numbers. By minimizing (25), the auto path flow, |auto
rvsk
pf , and railway flow, 
rail
rvskq , can be obtained. Equivalently, by setting the gap function to be zero, i.e. ( ) 0G  Ζ , it can be considered as 
the equilibrium constraint to be satisfied in a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC), as 
discussed in the next section. It can be verified readily that when ( )G Ζ  attains the value of zero, the entire NCP 
(16)-(24) is satisfied [19].  
 
2.2 Developer’s investment decisions 
   
Section 2.1 describes residents’ location and travel choices based on fixed housing and transport supply, 
which is formulated as a combined equilibrium formulation. On top of that, the developer’s joint railway and 
housing investment decisions are determined, as shown schematically in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. The joint railway and housing development model
The investment cost on the railway, TB , include the initial construction cost on all the railway lines, TCB , and 
the operational cost, TOst b , expressed as:
T TC TOB B st b , (28)
where st is the number of trains operated on a railway line, TOb is the overall operational cost per train, where
the initial purchase price of a train is also converted and included in TOb for simplicity. Note that the highway
network is assumed to be given and fixed. The revenue from the railway investment equals the total fare
collected, expressed as:
rail
rs rs
T
rs
q cpR ¦ , (29)
where rail
rsq is the number of railway passengers between OD pair r and s , as defined in (8). On the other 
hand, the investment cost on the housing supply, HB , is the sum of investment cost on different housing types
and locations, expressed as:
v rv
H H
v r
B b <¦¦ , (30)
where vHb is the unit investment cost of housing type v . In this study, it is assumed to be increasing with the 
unit housing lost size vls , as defined in (10). rv< is the number of housing unit of type v to be invested in 
residential location r . In this formulation, since the total housing demand is fixed and equal to the total housing 
supply, the total number of housing units < is also fixed. Thereby, the decisions on housing supply are 
measured by the proportion of type v housing units to be invested in residential location r , i.e. Pr rv . And the
number of housing units of type v in residential location r is expressed as:
Prrv rv<  < , (31)
The total revenue from housing investment, HR , equals the total housing rent collected from the housing
market, expressed as:
rv rv
H
v r
R M < ¦¦ , (32)
where rvM is the resultant housing rent of type v in residential location r at equilibrium.
In this study, both the railway and housing investment decisions are made by a single profit-oriented 
developer. The problem is casted as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, expressed as:
Pr ,
Maximize  
rv rs rs H T THhw cp,
R R B B3  , (33)
subject to
( ) 0G , (34)
Constraints (1)-(15),
Pr 1rv
r v
¦¦ , (35)
H TB B B , (36)
Pr 0, ,rv v , (37)
, ,rshw hw hw r s , (38)
rscp cp cp r s, ,d d  , (39)
where Pr rv is the proportion of type v housing units to be invested in residential location r ; rshw is the
operational headway between OD pair r and s ; rscp is the train fare between OD pair r and s . (36) is the
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budget constraint for the overall investment. hw  and hw , cp and cp  are lower and upper bounds for headway 
and fare, respectively, to reflect technological barriers and planning regulations. Generally, the above MPEC is 
non-linear and non-convex, but can be solved by commercial non-linear mathematical programming solvers. The 
global optimality of solutions is not guaranteed, as is typical for MPEC problems. However, under some 
simplified conditions, some results can be derived analytically, as discussed in in the following section. 
 
2.3 Impact of joint railway and housing development 
   
The combined equilibrium formulation in (1)-(15) models residents’ location and travel choices given a fixed 
transport and housing system. It is of interest to analyze the resultant benefit redistribution among different 
stakeholders due to different railway and housing investment strategies, such as changes in resident consumer 
surplus, railway and housing developer’ producer surplus, as well as the overall social welfare. Despite that the 
following analytical results are developed for the case of one OD pair or a single corridor, the results are 
revealing. In Section 2.4, we will conduct sensitivity analyses to further demonstrate these properties. Generally 
speaking, the analytical results obtained for the simple one OD pair with multiple travel modes are echoed by the 
numerical studies that implement the model for a network with multiple OD pairs, as described in Section 3. 
To simplify notation, superscripts r  and s  are dropped in the following discussion. The decision variables 
are denoted as Pr , ,  and v hw cp . The general conditions are defined below: 
 
0( ) :  H The network comprises one residential location and one workplace, with residents belonging to 
different income groups ( 1,2,...,k K ). The housing demand for each income group , kH , is fixed. 
1( ) :  H There are several housing types v  with different lot sizes vls  to be invested, such that 
1 2 ... Vls ls ls   . The supply for each housing type v  is given by Prv v<  < .The total housing 
demand k
k
H H ¦  equals the total housing supply < .  
2( ) :  H There are two travel modes between the OD pair, i.e. auto and metro, with one path linking the 
residential location and workplace for each travel mode. The link performance function of auto is 
an increasing function of demand, e.g. the BPR function. 
3( ) :  H Travelers have different values of time, such that 1 2 ... Kvot vot vot   . 
 
Proposition 1 Under conditions 0 3( ) ( )H H , any changes in railway investment, e.g. headway and/or fare, do not 
induce any changes in residents’ choices on housing types. 
 
Proof 
Let’s consider that the change in railway headway hww  or fare cpw  introduces a corresponding change in 
travel disutility via (1)-(7), denoted as , 1,2,...,k k KP'  , which is different for different income group k  but 
is fixed within each income group regardless of the housing type chosen. 
Proposition 1 is equivalent to saying that the change in probability of residents’ location choice for each 
housing type v , as defined in (12), is zero, expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/ / /
/
'/ '/ '/
' '
exp ( ) exp
Pr 0
exp ( ) exp
k v k v k v
k v
k v k v k v
k K k K
WP WP WP
WP WP WP
E E
E E
 
  ' '      ' ¦ ¦ .  (40) 
 
Simplifying (40), we have: 
 
 
 
'/ '/
/ '
'/
'
exp ( )
1 ln
exp
k v k v
k v k K
k v
k K
WP WP
WP
WP
E
E E


­ ½  '° °'  ® ¾° °¯ ¿
¦
¦ . (41) 
(41) implies that the resultant change in willingness-to-pay is the same for all income groups as the RHS is 
independent of a specific income group k , i.e.: 
 
 1/ 2/ /...v v K vWP WP WP'  '   ' , (42) 
According to (10), we have: 
 
 / ,  ,k v k kWP b k vP'  ' '  . (43) 
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In the logit modeling framework, only the relative utility between groups matters. By setting the utility index 1b  
of income group 1k   as defined in (10) to be zero, i.e. 1 0b  , we can always find a unique set of 
, 1,2,...,kb k K  so as to achieve the equilibrium of residential location choice for each given land use and 
transport supply [13]. As a result, the problem then is to prove that the equilibrium solution kb  after the change 
in railway investment fulfills (40) for each housing type v .  
By setting the utility index 1b  of income group 1k   as defined in (10) to be unchanged as a reference, i.e. 
1 1(1) 1(0) 0b b b'    , where 1(0) 1(1),b b , respectively, are the utility indices of 1b  before and after the change, we 
have: 
 1/ 1 1 1,  vWP b vP P'  ' '  '  , (44) 
 / (1) (0) ,  k v k k k k kWP b b b vP P'  ' '   '  , (45) 
where (0)kb  and (1)kb  refer to the solutions before and after the change, respectively. Using (42), by setting (44) 
equal to (45), we have: 
 (1) (0) 1,  k k kb b vP P ' '  .  (46) 
Putting (46) into (45), we have: 
 / 1,  k vWP vP'  '   (47) 
We can show that (47) fulfills (10). In other words, with the change in travel disutility kP'  fixed prior to 
the housing type decision, the new equilibrium solution after the change can be found by selecting (1)kb  
according to (46), which satisfies (40) and also all the supply constraints as the housing type decisions by each 
income group k  before and after the change are the same. As a result, the residents’ choice on housing types is 
not changed, expressed as: 
 /Pr 0vk v k vq'  < '  . (48) 
■ 
   
Note that Proposition 1 is only valid for the case of one OD pair. For the case with multiple OD pairs, since 
the change of travel disutility, rkP' , is not necessarily the same among different residential location r  for the 
same income group k , i.e. ' '' ,  ' '', ' , ''r k r k r r r R r RP P' z '  z   . As a result, according to (44)-(46), we may 
not always be able find a set of (1) ,  1,2,...,kb k K  such that 1/ 2/ /...r r K rWP WP WP'  '   '  is satisfied for each 
residential location r . 
 
Corollary 1 Under conditions 0 3( ) ( )H H , any changes in railway investment, e.g. headway and/or fare, induce 
neither changes in individual consumer surplus nor total consumer surplus. 
 
Proof 
According to (14), the change in housing rent vM  is: 
 
 
 
 
'/ '/
/ 1'
'/
'
exp ( )
1 ln
exp
sk r sk r
r k vk K
sk r
k K
WP WP
WP
WP
E
M PE E


§ ·  '¨ ¸'   '  '¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦
¦ . (49) 
 
Therefore, the change in housing rent is the same as the change in willingness-to-pay and equals the change in 
travel disutility of the income group 1k  . Furthermore, according to (7), if conditions 2 3( ) ( )H H  are 
simplified to one travel mode and homogeneous value of time, we conclude that any reduction in travel cost due 
to transport improvement leads to an equivalent increase in housing rent [13]. 
According to (15) and (44)-(49), the corresponding change in consumer surplus is: 
 
 / 0vk k v vCS WP M'  ' '  . (50) 
 
That is, changes in headway and/or fare do not result in changes in individual consumer surplus. In other 
words, residents do not receive any benefit from the transport improvement. Accordingly, we can conclude that 
the total consumer surplus is also not changed. 
It can also be proved in the following way. According to Proposition 1, we have: 
 
 
1/ 2/ / '/
... , ' {1,2,..., }
v v K v k vWP WP WP WP k K
hw hw hw hw
w w w w     w w w w , (51) 
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1/ 2/ / '/
... , ' {1,2,..., }
v v K v k vWP WP WP WP k K
cp cp cp cp
w w w w     w w w w . (52) 
 
Accordingly, we have: 
 
'/
, ' {1,2,..., }
v k vWP k K
hw hw
Mw w  w w , (53) 
 
'/
, ' {1,2,..., }
v k vWP k K
hw hw
Mw w  w w , (54) 
 
/
0
vk k v vCS WP
hw hw hw
Mw w w   w w w , (55) 
 
/
0
vk k v vCS WP
cp cp cp
Mw w w   w w w . (56) 
 
/ / /
/ / /Pr Pr Pr Pr 0
k v k v k v
k v k v k v
k
WP WP
hw hw hw
E E § ·w w w        ¨ ¸w w w© ¹¦ , (57) 
 
/ / /
/ / /Pr Pr Pr Pr 0
k v k v k v
k v k v k v
k
WP WP
cp cp cp
E E § ·w w w        ¨ ¸w w w© ¹¦ . (58) 
Define the total consumer surplus as: 
   /Pr Prv k v vk
k v
CS CS <  ¦¦ .  (59) 
The partial derivatives of total consumer surplus with respect to headway, hw , and fare, cp , are calculated 
by: 
 
 
/
/ PrPr Pr Pr 0
vk k v
v k v vk v
v k
CS CS CS
hw hw hw
§ ·w w w <       ¨ ¸w w w© ¹¦¦ ,  (60) 
 
/
/ PrPr Pr Pr 0
vk k v
v k v vk v
v k
CS CS CS
cp cp cp
§ ·w w w <       ¨ ¸w w w© ¹¦¦ .  (61) 
■ 
  
 Note that the unchanged consumer surplus for every income group in residential housing choice does not 
indicate that the overall impact of transport system changes (e.g. headway and fare) on residents of different 
income groups are the same. Actually, our previous research proved that residents with higher incomes and 
hence higher values of time benefit more from transport system improvements [13]. Without going into the 
details of the proof, the intuition is that an improvement in transport infrastructure or reduction in transport cost 
will lead to an increase in housing rent, 1P'  according to (49), which is the same for all income groups and is 
equal to the travel cost as valued by the lowest income group 1k  . The same travel time saving would be 
valued higher by higher income groups due to their higher values of time. Therefore, for higher income groups, 
the increase in rental cost is smaller than the travel cost saving gained from transport infrastructure improvement. 
Hence, higher income groups will gain more from transport infrastructure improvements, or a regressive effect.  
In the next proposition, we show that any degradation in transport service, either in terms of longer headway 
or higher fare, will result in higher travel disutility, and consequentially reduction in housing rent. This result 
seems obvious, but nevertheless, can be established rigorously via the analytical formluation.  
 
Proposition 2 Under conditions 0 3( ) ( )H H , the travel disutility for every income group is monotonically 
increasing with headway and railway fare. The housing rent is monotonically decreasing with headway and 
fare. 
 
Proof 
We first prove the property with respect to headway hw . For the travel cost by railway, according to (1)-(2), 
we have: 
 rail 0
k
k
cti
c vot
hw
Nw   !w . (62) 
 
For the travel cost by auto, according to (3)-(5) and condition 2( )H , we have: 
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 auto auto
auto
k
k ka ac t t qvot vot
hw hw q hw
w w w w    w w w w , (63) 
where autoq  is the auto demand, which can be calculated by: 
 
 auto rail railPr
vk k
v k
q q q <  < ¦¦ . (64) 
Substituting (64) into (63), we have: 
 
 auto railrail
auto
PrPr
k kvk
k k vka
v k
c t qvot q
hw q hw hw
§ ·w w ww      ¨ ¸w w w w© ¹¦¦ . (65) 
 
In (65), according to condition 2( )H , / 0a autot qw w ! . The first derivative in the bracket is zero, i.e. 
/ 0vkq hww w  , according to Proposition 1. In addition, according to (6), since the increase in travel cost by 
railway will result in a demand shift from railway to auto, it can be concluded that the second derivative term in 
the bracket is negative, expressed as: 
 
 railPr 0
k
hw
w w . (66) 
Therefore, in (65), we have auto / 0
kc hww w ! . 
 
Eventually, according to (7), (10), and (14), we have: 
 rail autorail autoPr Pr 0
k kk
k kc c
hw hw hw
P w ww     !w w w , (67) 
 
/
0
k vWP
hw
w w , (68) 
 
/
/Pr 0
v k v
k v
k
WP
hw hw
M § ·w w  ¨ ¸w w© ¹¦ . (69) 
 
Similarly, we conclude the same results with respect to the railway fare cp , expressed as: 
 rail
Pr 0
k
cp
w w , (70) 
 0
k
cp
Pw !w , (71) 
 
/
0
k vWP
cp
w w , (72) 
 
/
/Pr 0
v k v
k v
k
WP
cp cp
M § ·w w  ¨ ¸w w© ¹¦ . (73) 
■ 
 
Corollary 2 Under conditions 0 3( ) ( )H H , there exists an optimal headway such that the producer surplus of a 
joint railway and housing development is maximized. More importantly, the producer surplus is monotonically 
decreasing with railway fare in a multi-modal transport network. 
 
Proof 
First let us check the partial derivative of the producer surplus of a joint railway and housing developer’s 
overall profit as defined in (33), with respect to the headway hw . According to (28)-(32) and (66), we have: 
 
 '/
0, ' {1,2,..., }
v v
k v
vHR WP k K
hw hw hw
M§ ·w <¨ ¸w w© ¹  <    w w w
¦ , (74) 
 /rail
Pr Pr 0
k
v k vT
v k
R
cp
hw hw
w § ·w <    ¨ ¸w w© ¹¦ ¦ , (75) 
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 0HB
hw
w  w , (76) 
 0T TO
B stb
hw hw
w w  w w . (77) 
 
According to (74)-(77), both the railway revenue and cost are monotonically decreasing with the headway; 
the housing investment is not changed with the headway, while the housing revenue are monotonically 
decreasing with the headway. As a result, according to (33), there exists an optimal headway such that the 
producer surplus of a joint railway and housing developer is maximized. 
Similarly, the partial derivative of the producer surplus of a joint railway and housing developer with respect 
to the railway fare cp  is expressed as: 
 
  / rail railPr Pr 0v k v kH
v k
R q
cp
w § ·  <     ¨ ¸w © ¹¦ ¦ , (78) 
 /railrail
Pr Pr
k
v k vT
v k
R
q cp
cp cp
w § ·w  <   ¨ ¸w w© ¹¦ ¦ , (79) 
 
0
v v
H
vH
b
B
cp cp
§ ·w <¨ ¸w © ¹  w w
¦ , (80) 
 
( )
0TC TOT
B st bB
cp cp
w  w   w w . (81) 
 
Therefore, according to (70) and (78)-(81), the partial derivative of producer surplus with respect to fare is 
expressed as: 
 
/railPr Pr 0
H T H T
k
v k v
v k
R BR B
cp cp cp cp cp
cp
cp
w ww ww3    w w w w w
§ ·w <    ¨ ¸w© ¹¦ ¦
. (82) 
■ 
As a result, according to Proposition 2 and Corollary 2, the producer surplus is monotonically decreasing with 
railway fare in the presence of competing travel modes. Therefore, in a joint railway and property development 
scheme, the developer will keep the railway fare at a low level in order to maintain the producer surplus at a high 
level; the gain from property rental value gain offsets the reduction in fare revenue.   
Note also that in the logit modeling framework, only the relative utility between groups matters. By setting the 
utility index 1b  of income group 1k   as defined in (10) to be unchanged as a reference, i.e. 1 0b'  , if 
railway is the only available travel mode, i.e. railPr 1
k  , the total profit will not be affected by the change in 
railway fare, since any railway fare increase (reduction) will be fully absorbed in the resultant housing rent by 
the same level of reduction (increase).  
 
2.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
   
The properties derived in the previous section are illustrated by sensitivity analyses here. To be consistent, the 
analyses here consider that there is one residential location and one workplace connected by a railway line and a 
highway link. Travelers’ railway waiting time is assumed to be half of the headway. The BPR function is used to 
calculate the auto travel time. The housing investment involves two types of units with different lot sizes, Big 
and Small units. Residents are stratified into two income groups with different values of time, e.g. High and 
Low. Each income group has a different preference on the lot size. At each equilibrium solution for a set of 
given housing and transport supply, the utility index of residents of Low income group, i.e. Lb , is set to be 
unchanged, fixed at zero.  
Two sensitivity scenarios are conducted. Scenario 1 studies the combined decisions on headway and housing 
type, with fixed railway fare. Scenario 2 studies the combined decisions on railway fare and housing type, with 
fixed headway. 
 
2.4.1 Developer’s cost and revenue 
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In Fig. 2-4, the horizontal axis refers to the proportion of Big units to be developed, and the vertical axis refers 
to headway for the figure on the left, and fare for the figure on the right. This set of figures is to illustrate how 
housing investment and revenue, shown as contours in Fig. 2, transport investment and revenue, shown as 
contours in Fig. 3, and producer surplus, shown as contours in Fig. 4, vary with the provision of Big units and 
transport system attributes.   
Firstly, from the housing investment perspective, as shown in Fig. 2, the housing investment increases as the 
proportion of Big units increases, which is obvious. Meanwhile, for a fixed proportion of Big units, i.e., tracing 
along a vertical line on either the left or right figure of Fig. 2, the housing revenue (blue or solid contour) 
decreases as the headway or fare increases, confirming Proposition 2.  
Another interesting observation is that, as shown in Fig. 2, for a fixed level of headway or fare, i.e. tracing 
along a horizontal line on either figure of Figure 2, there is an optimal proportion of Big units such that the total 
housing revenue is maximized, around the provision of 80% Big units.  
Secondly, as shown in Fig. 3, decreases in headway, which require more trains and higher operating costs, 
result in increases in railway investment cost. Moreover, a shorter headway attract more travelers, which bring in 
a higher railway revenue. On the other hand, as the railway fare increases, the total railway revenue increases 
although the total railway demand decreases. Note that the changes in railway investment cost and revenue are 
not affected by housing type investments, since the travel demand by income group is fixed. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The cost and revenue of housing investment 
 
 
Fig. 3. The cost and revenue of railway investment 
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Fig. 4. The total profit or producer surplus 
Combining the costs and revenues of housing and railway investments together, we obtain their combined 
overall profit for a single developer. As shown in Fig. 4, the maximum profit for the combined housing and 
headway decision occurs when the headway is set at 6-min and the proportion of Big units at 55%. For the 
combined housing and railway fare decision, the maximum profit occurs at a very low, close to zero fare and the 
provision of 55% Big units. In this study, the results indicate the same optimal housing investment decision for 
both scenarios. While we cannot conclude that this outcome will always hold, the more interesting observation is 
that the optimal joint railway and housing investment decision is to set the fare at a very low level, close to zero. 
This, actually, should not be surprising, given the earlier results that any reduction in transport cost can be 
recovered by corresponding increases in housing rents, when both types of revenues belong to the same 
developer.   
 
2.4.2 Residents’ choices and surplus 
 
Given different combinations of housing supplies and railway service levels, residents make their location and 
travel choices accordingly, with different resultant benefit distributions in terms of consumer surplus (CS). As 
shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the consumer surpluses for both income groups do not change with any railway 
service improvement, e.g. reduced headway or fare. That is, any travel cost reductions introduced by transport 
system improvement lead to corresponding increases in housing rents, thus neutralizing their effects on CS3. 
However, change in housing supply, e.g. proportion of Big housing unit, does change residence choice and 
resultant CS.  
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 5, the CS of the high-income group increases with the provision of more Big 
units, and vice versa for the low-income group. Combining the CS of the high-income and low-income groups, 
the optimal provision occurs at the extreme ends, either providing exclusively Big or exclusive Small units. The 
lowest combined CS occurs at the mid-range, or 50% Big units. This result is interesting and certainly deserves 
further studies to confirm whether it will hold for a wide range of scenarios or only for the limited study here. It 
implies that there is a tradeoff between the CS of the high-income group versus that of the low-income group, 
and society’s overall CS. 
 
 
Fig. 5. The total consumer surplus by income group 
                                                          
3 This result holds based on the assumption that intrinsic housing attributes, and other types of externalities, such as environmental 
externality, location externality, etc. remain unchanged.  
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Fig. 6. The total consumer surplus 
 
2.4.2.1 Comparison with other objectives 
 
We study two scenarios here. Scenario 1 studies the combined decisions on headway and housing type, with 
fixed railway fare. Scenario 2 studies the combined decisions on railway fare and housing type, with fixed 
headway. Summing up the total consumer surplus and total producer surplus, we obtain the overall social 
welfare, as shown in Fig. 7. We notice that the investment decision that gives rise to the maximum social welfare 
occurs at 6-min headway and about 100% Big units for Scenario 1, and at zero fare and 100% Big units for 
Scenario 2.  
Fig. 4 and Fig. 7 demonstrate the decisions according to two different planning perspectives for a single 
decision-maker; Figure 4 shows the result for maximizing total profit by a private developer and Fig. 7 for 
maximizing social welfare by the government. While the exact optimal decisions are likely to be case specific 
and parameter dependent, the comparison between these two results shows that both objectives would likely 
produce similarly good transport system performance, i.e. short headway and low fare. The key difference is in 
the housing supply market. The profit-seeking objective would create a shortage of large units, whereas the 
social welfare objective would produce a large amount of large units to drive down the housing rents.     
Nowadays, when the government is short of funding for large-scale housing and transport infrastructure 
investments, the participation of private developers is widely accepted. However, in joint railway and property 
developments, while the synergy between them is clearly evident, the result here seems to indicate that 
regulating the housing supply is just as important, if not more so, in this joint development scheme.  
 
 
Fig. 7. The social welfare 
 
 
3. Numerical studies 
 
This section demonstrates the above joint railway and housing development in a generic mono-centric city 
(one CBD, four residential zones) with two alternative travel modes, e.g. auto and railway. As shown in Fig. 8, 
Zone 1 and Zone 2 are two existing residential zones connected to the CBD by highway links and an existing 
railway line R1. Zone 3 and Zone 4 are newly planned residential zones, which will be connected to the CBD by 
highway links and a planned railway line R2. The developer needs to make joint investment decisions on R2 
(including headway and fare) and housing supply (with two housing types) in Zone 3 and Zone 4 so as to 
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maximize the overall profit. Note that the housing supplies in Zone 1 and Zone 2 and the headway of railway
Line 1 are fixed. However, the railway fare, e.g. HKD/km, is changeable, the same for both R1 and R2. For the 
residents side, the underlying assumptions include: a) one worker per household, and he evaluates the residential 
zones based on his perceived travel costs4, as defined in (7) and (10); b) each household resides in one housing 
unit; c) the total housing demand, including both the existing population residing in the old residences and the
new residents, are free to choose their new residential locations after the new joint housing and railway
development.
Fig. 8. A TOD network
3.1 The optimal joint railway and housing investments
Table 1 and Table 2 are the resultant housing and railway investment decisions. The new investment decisions
choose a relatively shorter headway for the new railway R2 and larger proportions of Small housing units in both
Zone 3 and Zone 4. Besides, the developer invests more housing units in Zone 4 which is closer to the CBD.
Table 1. The railway investment decisions
Indicators Unit R1 R2
Headway min 5 (fixed) 1.7
Fare HKD/km 1.8 1.8
Table 2. The housing investment decisions
Housing
type
Old areas
(in 1000 units)
New areas
(in 1000 units)
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Sub-total
Big 15 15 2.8 (5.5%) 3.3 (6.5%) 6.1 (12%)
Small 10 10 20.3 (40.7%) 23.6 (47.3%) 43.9 (88%)
Total 25 25 23.1 (46.2%) 26.9 (54.8%) 50 (100%)
3.2 Impacts on residents’ choices and land value
Table 3 - Table 6 show the residents’ resultant travel and location choices, as well as the impacts on land value
and transport system performance. For the transport modal choices, as shown in Table 3, travelers from the low 
income group prefer to take the railway which has a relatively longer travel time due to their lower value of time.
On the other hand, residents living in the newly planned zones are more attracted by the railway because of its
shorter headway. Furthermore, residents living in Zone 2 and Zone 4, which are closer to the CBD, prefer to take
the railway than auto, because they generally experience high highway congestion, as observed from the
highway link volume to capacity (V/C) ratios in Table 4. For the residential location and housing choices, as
shown in Table 5, the probabilities of residents from the high income group living in Zone 2 and Zone 4 are 
higher than those of the low income group. It implies that residents’ with higher incomes and higher value of 
times are more likely to reside in more attractive locations, e.g. higher accessibility and Big units. Meanwhile, 
the resultant housing rents of both Big and Small units in these two locations are also relatively higher than the
4 See more discussions in Ma and Lo [13]
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ones that are far from the CBD, as shown in Table 6. These observations demonstrate that changes in the 
transport system not only alter travelers’ travel choices but also have significant impact on residents’ location 
choices and land values.  
Table 3. Residents’ travel mode choices 
Income Group Mode Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
High Auto 69% 42% 50% 22% 
Rail 31% 58% 50% 78% 
Low Auto 56% 32% 43% 20% 
Rail 44% 68% 57% 80% 
 
Table 4. The highway link congestion levels (V/C ratio) 
Highway Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 
V/C ratio 0.77 1.04 0.53 1.02 0.55 0.35 
 
Table 5. Residents’ location and housing choices 
Housing type Income 
Group 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Big High 7.0 (46%) 5.4 (54%) 1.3 (49%) 1.9 (58%) 
Low 8.0 (54%) 4.6 (46%) 1.4 (51%) 1.4 (42%) 
Small High 4.4 (44%) 7.7 (51%) 9.3 (46%) 13.0 (55%) 
Low 5.6 (56%) 7.3 (49%) 11.0 (54%) 10.6 (45%) 
 
Table 6. The housing rents 
Housing rent Unit Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Big HKD/day 109 120 123 131 
Small HKD/day 108 114 106 114 
 
3.3 The overall system performance 
 
Table 7. Comparisons of the overall system performance 
Outcome indicators Scenario A 
(Joint rail and 
housing investment) 
Scenario B 
(Same rail and housing 
investment) 
Scenario C 
(Same housing but 
optimized rail investment) 
Total travel timea 533 589 10.5% 539 1.1% 
Total consumer surplusb 1,340 1,237 -7.7% 1,238 -7.6% 
Housing investment costc 1,736 1,880 8.3% 1,880 8.3% 
Housing revenuec 2,049 2,092 2.1% 2,104 2.7% 
Railway investment costc 234 212 -9.4% 233 -0.4% 
Railway fare revenuec 107 62 -42.1% 110 2.8% 
Developer’s total profitc 185 62 -66.5% 102 -44.9% 
Social welfarec 187 63 -66.3% 103 -44.9% 
a The unit is thousand minutes/day;   b The unit is million HKD/day;  c The unit is million HKD/year. 
 
Table 7 shows the comparisons of the system performance among different investment strategies. Scenario A 
is the performance resulted from the joint rail and housing investment as formulated in this study. Scenario B is 
the performance resulted from planning the new area exactly the same as the old area, i.e. the housing unit 
distribution and railway operations follow the same as the old ones. Scenario C is the performance resulted from 
optimizing the railway operations alone while keeping the land use layout of the new area same as the old one. 
Column 4 and Column 6 are the comparisons of performances between the joint investment decision and the 
other two strategies as measured by their percentage differences. Generally, the performances of Scenario A are 
better than the other two Scenarios in most aspects. The joint housing and railway investment scheme not only 
maximizes the developer’s total profit, but also results in higher consumer surplus and social welfare. In 
addition, it also reduces the total travel time. These results show that the joint housing and railway development 
performs better than separate housing and railway investment decisions, as it is more flexible in internalizing the 
tradeoff between housing and transport investments and revenues. The results also re-iterate that joint housing 
and railway development tends to improve the transport sysem performance on its own intiative, as evidenced in 
the total system travel time, which could be over-compensated by corresponding rental gains.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper developed a modeling framework to study the impact of joint railway and housing development on 
the system performance and benefit distribution among stakeholders. The problem was formulated as a 
mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Analytical results were obtained for a single 
corridor in a multi-modal transport network. A monotonic relationship was found between changes in land value 
and railway service quality, i.e. better railway service always leads to higher land value or housing prices, which 
is consistent with existing empirical studies. A numerical example was performed to find the optimal joint 
railway and housing development. The results generally showed that joint development strategy is systematically 
better than treating railway and housing developments separately, in terms of overall social welfare and railway 
service quality, which confirm that there are benefits to be gained by exploiting the synergy between railway and 
housing developments.  
The study results also indicate that joint railway and housing developments tend to introduce transport system 
improvement on its own initiative, in return for gains in housing revenue. On the other hand, if the objective is to 
optimize for social welfare, it is important to regulate the housing supply; the objectives of profit-seeking and 
social welfare can produce very different housing development patterns. One of the interesting extensions, 
therefore, is to study planning regulations so as to balance the interests of all the stakeholders.  
In the implementation of railway projects, Hong Kong’s experience demonstrates the importance of private 
sector participation, either in the railway or the property side, or both. Public-private partnership (PPP) can be 
considered as a way to transfer certain inherent risks from the public sector to the private partner who may be 
able to better manage the risks [20], which could be, for example, alleviated by building in recourse 
considerations in the development strategy [21]. One initiative of this study is to analyze the benefit distribution 
among different stakeholders under different types of investments in an integrated and broader analytical 
framework. Once this problem is formulated and understood, various extensions can be explored, such as 
comparing the performances with other forms of PPP. In this paper, we studied joint rail and housing 
development by a single profit-oriented developer, which is one type of PPP, to understand the benefit 
distribution among all stakeholders. Studying the implications of other types of PPP, together with an 
understanding of the interactions between the government and private developers, will produce further insights 
for developing joint railway and housing projects.  
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